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Most theories of metaphor look at what occurs inside a metaphorical phrase and 
posit a shift in meaning in the metaphorical words. This includes the classic “Models and 
Metaphor,” by Max Black, who distinguishes between the literal words of the phrase and 
the metaphorical words. On this view, the two interact in such a way that the meanings of 
the metaphorical words change. In another view, Donald Davidson takes a radical stance 
in his “What Metaphors Mean” to assert that the words in a metaphor mean nothing other 
than their original, literal meaning. Both theories suffer from problems: Black fails to 
explain how the metaphorical words change in meaning. Davidson, on the other hand, 
while succeeding in refuting most of the “other meaning” theories, only weakly suggests 
“use” of metaphor to explain its power. In this paper, I will clarify the two respective 
theories and attempt to reconcile or fuse them. We will find that Black looks to the 
language itself and finds a shift in meaning, while Davidson asserts that meaning stays 
literal, and we must instead look at what occurs between the speaker and hearer. An 
examination of Davidson’s later theory of interpretation applied to Black’s theory of 
metaphor will clarify Davidson’s ‘use’ as well as allow for literal meaning to stay in 
metaphor. 
 
Black’s “System of Associated Commonplaces” 
Max Black’s account of metaphor focuses on the “logical grammar” (Black 25) of 
the metaphor and how this grammar defines what one uses or interprets as a metaphor. 
He begins by directly positing a grammar of metaphor, distinguishing between the 
“focus” and the “frame” of metaphor. The focus of a metaphor is the word in a metaphor 
that is being used metaphorically. “In calling this former sentence a metaphor, we are 
implying that there is one word that is being used metaphorically” (Black 28). The rest of 
the sentence (those words which are not being used metaphorically) is called the ‘frame.’ 
For example, consider the following metaphor: “John is a wolf.” Under Black’s 
description, “John is” is the frame of the metaphor, and “a wolf” is the focus of the 
metaphor, which is the word being “used metaphorically.” 
Black’s own interaction view of metaphor is “when we use a metaphor we have 
two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, 
whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction” (Black 38). Thus one might say that the 
two thoughts come from the distinct difference between the focus and the frame of the 
metaphor, and only because the thoughts or meanings were distinct before the metaphor 
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may they interact in this context. Yet Black goes further to assert that the focus of 
the metaphor must acquire a new meaning when put into its new frame. This meaning “is 
not quite its meaning in literal uses, nor quite the meaning which any literal substitute 
would have” (Black 39). The extended meaning comes about through what Black calls 
their “system of associated commonplaces” (Black 40): when one imagines all those 
ideas one associates with John, and all of the ideas one associates with wolves, unshared 
ideas fall away, and what remains is the force of the focus, those commonplaces 
associated with both thoughts. Thus the associated commonplaces work because all those 
qualities that one thinks of about wolves and about men that come together to give wolf a 
new meaning. Here is Black’s elucidation:  
 
Suppose I look at the night sky through a piece of heavily smoked glass on which certain lines 
have been left clear. Then I shall see only the stars that can be made to lie on the lines 
previously prepared upon the screen, and the stars I do see will be seen as organized by the 
screen’s structure. We can think of a metaphor as such a screen and the system of “associated 
commonplaces” of the focal word as the network of lines upon the screen. We can say that the 
principle subject is “seen through” the metaphorical expression, or, if we prefer, that the 




















Works at a bank 
Has a wife named Judy 
Loves his scotch 
and soda 
Eats small animals 
Moves in a pack 
Communicates 
through barking 
The frame: John The focus: a wolf
Bad at scrabble
Guides itself through 
scents 
The focus’ new meaning imposed by the frame 
 It is not immediately clear, however, why the focus, and not the frame, of the 
metaphor should act as the screen that forces non-associated commonplaces to fall away. 
It is clear that both thoughts have commonplaces that need to fall away in order for them 
to be “active” together. When we say, “John is a wolf” there are certain attributes to both 
that must fall away, for example “covered in fur” (maybe not, considering who John is) 
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or “has a way with words.” Yet Black gives us no reason for understanding why the focus 
of the metaphor is somehow more primary or accessible and able to make act upon the 
commonplaces of the frame. One wonders whether or not this problem stems from the 
fact that we allowed Black the supposition that we know without explanation how to 
distinguish focus from frame. 
 
Davidson’s “Use” Theory 
In What Metaphors Mean (1978), Donald Davidson attempts to show that most 
philosophical discussion about the nature of metaphors has been greatly mistaken in 
positing a different, extensional, or “metaphorical” meaning to metaphors. He argues 
instead that metaphors mean nothing other than their literal sense, and that they gain their 
effective power through their use. Davidson explains that metaphor must retain its literal 
meaning through a series of negative arguments against theories that posit a different, 
new, or extensional meaning. While Davidson’s explanation may clarify many missteps 
previously made in theories of metaphor, his own theory, as I will show, will suffer from 
a lack of a positive argument for what he calls “use” of a metaphor. 
Davidson’s rejection of previous theories of metaphor takes the form of two kinds 
of attacks. The first attack argues that positing metaphorical or figurative meanings to 
metaphor does not do any work to explain metaphors. It is, in fact, blatantly circular. 
Davidson argues that if one were to attribute a metaphorical meaning to metaphor, the 
power of explanation would work in reverse: that calling a phrase a metaphor explains 
why it would seem to have another sense or ‘metaphorical truth.’ 
 
…[T]o simply lodge [metaphorical] meaning in metaphor is like explaining how a pill puts you to 
sleep by saying it has a dormative power.  Literal meaning and literal truth conditions can be 
assigned to words and sentences apart from particular contexts of use. This is why adverting to 
them has genuine explanatory power (Davidson 1978, 31). 
 
We must remember that the literal meaning of the metaphor must remain somehow part 
of the meaning of the metaphor. Davidson takes this stance as his second attack: that any 
new meaning assigned to metaphors would necessarily exclude a relation to the old 
meaning. This brings us to an unacceptable result, for, he argues, everyone agrees that the 
literal meaning is necessary in decoding a metaphor. “If we are to think of words in 
metaphors as directly going about their business of applying to what they properly do 
apply to, there is no difference between metaphor and the introduction of a new term into 
our vocabulary” (Davidson 1978, 32). Thus, Davidson argues, if we impose a new or 
extensional meaning to the metaphorical word, we are instead simply creating a new 
word in the vocabulary. Without a connection to the original literal meaning of the word, 
we are simply assigning a new literal meaning and asserting a condition to which this 
new meaning applies. We are not making a metaphor.  
We await a positive argument for how metaphor works. Davidson asserts at the 
end of his work that metaphor gets its power solely from the effect it has on the hearer. 
Previous theories have made the mistake of defining their goal incorrectly, though how 
they arrive at their conclusions is not so far off. They have tried too hard to make their 
intuitions that metaphor is different in some way conform to their goal of finding the 
difference in the language itself. “The common error is to fasten on the contents of the 
thoughts a metaphor provokes and to read these contents into the metaphor itself” 
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(Davidson 1978, 43). Therefore, instead of looking inside the metaphor itself, we should 
be looking at those using language to produce effects on those listening. The hearer is 
“nudged,” “incited,” to recognize something, as an effect of the use of the words with 
their literal meanings. As Davidson pointed out earlier, “Metaphor is the dreamwork of 
language, and, like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as 
on the originator” (Davidson 1978, 29). Davidson’s comment will prove useful when we 
discuss his theory of “prior” and “passing” theories. 
Yet for the moment we still have a few problems to keep in mind. Even if 
Davidson successfully convinces us that the words in the metaphor have only their literal 
meaning to propel them, his explanation that use is what gives us a metaphor falls short. 
If, as he claims, there is “no manual for determining what a metaphor ‘means’ or ‘says,’” 
(Davidson 1978, 29) we still have no clear idea on how to determine when someone is 
making a metaphor and when they are making an assertion, or, in fact, simply lying to us. 
For example, if someone says to us “Joan is a witch,” Davidson does not explain how use 
could make clear the way we were to take the phrase, for there are circumstances when 
we are mistaken. Though Davidson wants to say that there is no stateable or assertable 
message to metaphor, he surely would admit that there was a failure, even when words 
were “used” in a different way, if the hearer took the sentence to be literal and was 
“nudged” into noticing something, but believing something else. We will need a more 
comprehensive account of what Davidson means by “use” if we are to understand his 
theory, despite his thorough dismantling of all other “extensional,” “different,” or 
“metaphorical” meaning theories. We will see that his explanation of prior and passing 
theories can clarify this problem. 
 
Black’s Response & Remaining Problems 
 Black responds to Davidson in How Metaphors Work: A Reply to Donald 
Davidson (1979) and points out that though Davidson does a rigorous job of rejecting 
most metaphor theories, he fails to produce a coherent positive theory of his own. 
Davidson held that because there is no stateable cognitive content of a metaphor, because 
similarities go on for infinity, and because any attempt to explain or paraphrase the 
metaphor necessarily kills it, that the metaphor-maker is not trying to say anything at all, 
only “nudge” the hearer into noticing something between the two. Because the metaphor 
means nothing than its literal sense, and the metaphor is patently false, any “facts” 
arrived at on the part of the hearer are coincidental, and not proposed by the metaphor-
maker. It is for this reason as well that Davidson denies metaphorical truth, since there 
can be no proposition in the metaphor that may have a true or false value. What, then, is 
the speaker doing when he’s using these words in a certain way? Davidson claims only 
that the speaker can’t be asserting anything because how he communicates it (metaphor) 
leaves open the possibilities for interpretation as infinite. 
Yet this does not prove that the speaker wasn’t attempting to assert something 
with his metaphor. Moreover, as Black points out, we do have misunderstanding in 
metaphor, especially if “nuance and discretion” is needed in interpreting a metaphor, as 
Davidson asserted earlier. A better route might be a Wittgensteinian interpretation: 
though metaphors say nothing, they are meant to show something to the hearer. The 
speaker uses the literal meanings of the words in a different way to attempt to show an 
idea to the hearer. I imagine Davidson’s “nudge” to be a sort of Wittgensteinian 
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“showing:” we literally bump the hearer into the right direction to see something 
interesting. Yet even still, the speaker has in mind what this interesting thing is before 
nudging the hearer. 
We seem to have arrived at an impasse. Black’s interaction theory gave us little 
insight into how metaphors work. His focus/frame explanation seems to make common 
sense, yet we are unable to unpack the theory enough to explain how the focus directs 
which associated commonplaces are left to fall and which remain in the hearer’s “lens.” 
Davidson counters Black’s claim and the claims of many others by switching the focus of 
our study from what content belongs to metaphor to what happens between a hearer and a 
speaker when a metaphor is used. However, Davidson remains vague about what use 
entails, for use alone cannot accurately describe what happens between speaker and 
hearer, despite the shift in our descriptive goal. 
I would like to propose that Davidson and Black may find their theories closer 
than they first appear. Black’s theory never denies that the original meaning is required in 
interpreting a metaphor. Though words retain their original meaning, they are attached to 
a different idea, presented by the context. It is possible that this is what Davidson means 
by use, but he fails to make his sense of use clear. What we need from Davidson is a 
more detailed account of what the conditions about use might be. Moreover, Black’s 
system of associated commonplaces (all those qualities that one thinks of about wolves 
and about men that could come together to give wolf a new meaning) does not seem to 
change the definition of “wolf,” as Davidson might claim, but simply bring to the surface 
those definitions that are in common with man. There isn’t a new meaning, but certain 
parts of the meaning, those which are not in common with “man,” fall away for the 
moment. In brief, our main problem remains a lack of definition of use, and a suspicion 
that Black’s system of associated commonplaces may help us in carving out a definition 
of “use” applicable to Davidson’s theory. 
 
Davidson’s Prior & Passing Theories 
For clarification of Davidson’s view on metaphor, we can turn to his assertions 
made in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (1985), a treatise on interpretation and 
translation. Though written after “What Metaphors Mean,” Davidson expands on a more 
comprehensive theory of language he was striking at in the earlier article. He sets out to 
show that any examination of language will not give us clues for interpretation or 
meaning. For Davidson, “nothing should be allowed to obliterate or even blur the 
distinction between speaker’s meaning and literal meaning” [Davidson 1985, 474]. In 
order to make this distinction, Davidson describes literal meaning, or, as he will now call 
it, “first meaning,” as first in the order of interpretation. Sometimes sentences or images 
cannot be understood without the first meaning established, other times, the context of 
the sentence must be understood before we can choose the first meaning of words. 
Davidson asserts that the intentions of the speaker make the choice clearer.  
Before we may understand the intentions of the speaker to extract his first 
meaning, Davidson must give some explanation of what occurs between a speaker and 
interpreter. He suggests the following: Both the speaker and the interpreter have what 
Davidson calls prior and passing theories. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he 
believes the interpreter’s prior theory to be, and the passing theory is the theory that he 
intends the interpreter to use. For the interpreter, the prior theory is the theory that he will 
  
Black & Davidson on Metaphor 61
use, established in advance, to interpret the speaker’s utterances. The passing theory is 
the actual theory that he does use to interpret the speaker. Prior theories do not 
necessarily have to be shared between the speaker and the interpreter, for anything of the 
prior theory that goes into the passing theory always changes during the linguistic 
interaction. The passing theory is contingent upon the exact occasion of the interaction. 
When passing theories do converge, either accidentally or on purpose, it can only be 
attributed to the constantly changing passing theories, which are not known in advance. 
 
I would like to propose that Davidson’s account of the prior and passing theories 
of speakers and hearers provides us with a more comprehensive account of what he 
means by “use” of metaphor. Our general dissatisfaction with Davidson’s claim that 
“use” constituted metaphor and not change in meaning was that he failed to give a 
thorough explanation of what occurs between speaker and hearer for there to be any 
“effect” on the hearer. As Black pointed out in his reply, because metaphors are a sort of 
speech act, and because they take place between two people, there must be some 
expected or desired state of interaction. What we require from Davidson is a clarification 
of how this state, the “effect” on the hearer created through the “use” of the speaker of 
the words’ literal meanings, comes to be. 
Prior Theory Passing Theory 
Speaker 
Hearer 
What the speaker 
believes the hearer’s prior 
theory to be. 
The theory the speaker 
intends the hearer to use 
in his interpretation. 
The theory the hearer has 
established in advance to 
use in interpretation. 
The actual theory the 
hearer does use to 
interpret the speaker. 
 Here is a scenario which might help us apply Davidson’s prior and passing 
theories to what occurs in a metaphor. We will again use the metaphor “John is a wolf” 
for our scenario. The speaker’s prior theory is what he believes the hearer’s theory of 
interpretation will be. Thus the speaker believes the hearer to have certain literal 
meanings of both “John” and “wolf.” The hearer’s prior theory is what he believes he will 
use coming into the interaction. Because interactions are context-specific according to 
Davidson, the hearer cannot postulate in advance any theory other than the literal 
meanings of “John” and “wolf.” However, it is when we attempt to explain passing 
theories that we run into a few difficulties. The speaker’s passing theory is the theory he 
intends the hearer to use. If the meanings of the words in metaphor are none other than 
literal, the speaker’s passing theory cannot be any different from what his prior theory 
was, since first or literal meaning is established in advance. Thus the speaker would 
intend “John” and “wolf” to be taken literally as “John” and “wolf,” no different from his 
prior theory above. The hearer’s passing theory is what he actually does use to interpret 
the metaphor. But again, the problem shows itself when we realize that, according to 
Davidson, the meaning of a metaphor is nothing other than the literal meaning, which 
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was the hearer’s prior theory as well. We must find a way to describe a difference in prior 
and passing theories while retaining only literal meaning of the words in a metaphor. 
 
We know that the speaker’s passing theory depends on the context of the 
linguistic interaction, for as Davidson has claimed, passing theories depend on individual 
linguistic interactions. As we have seen, “Joan is a witch” could be taken as a metaphor 
or as an assertion depending on the context. Thus the speaker’s prior theory encapsulates 
all contexts, but his passing theory requires that the hearer recognize (for his theory) that 
the interaction takes place in a certain context. It is the fact that the speaker has his prior 
theory (what he assumes the hearer’s literal meanings to be) but uses his passing theory 
(intends that the hearer recognize the literal meanings in a different context) to create the 
“effect” on the hearer: the recognition of literal meanings in new contexts. The hearer’s 
passing theory adapts his prior theory in recognizing the context of the use. This is what 
Davidson might call the “effect” on the hearer: the recognizance of the new context and 
the actual adaptation of theory, not change in meaning. 
Prior Theory Passing Theory 
Speaker 
Hearer 
Believes hearer’s prior 
theory to be the literal 
meanings of ‘John’ and 
‘wolf.’ 
Intends the hearer to use the 
literal meanings of ‘John’ 
and ‘wolf’ since metaphor is 
only literal meaning. 
Has literal meanings of 
‘John’ and ‘wolf’ 
established in advance 
that he intends on using. 
Actually uses literal 
meanings of ‘John’ and 
‘wolf’ to interpret metaphor. 
We are still a bit suspicious of the shift between prior and passing theories. 
Though we want to say that the literal meanings in a new context create an “effect” on 
the hearer, a shift between prior and passing theories, it still sounds like meaning changes 
between the hearer’s prior and passing theories, if not the speaker’s as well. Our goal 
remains to clarify what Davidson means by “use” through his prior and passing theories 
while allowing the meaning of metaphor to remain none other than its literal meaning. 
 
Systems of Associated Commonplaces in Prior and Passing Theories 
Black’s system of associated commonplaces may show us a way in which we may 
allow metaphor to retain its original meaning between prior and passing theories. Again, 
this system of associated common places is all those common place associations of the 
focus of the metaphor (that words or part taken to be the metaphor), and all those of the 
frame (the words or part taken to be literal). These two pools of common places are 
reduced down to only those that may apply to both: the focus of the metaphor forces the 
unwanted commonplaces of both to fall away. 
Black’s theory provides an interesting interpretation of Davidson’s prior and 
passing theories. The speaker’s prior theory is what he expects the hearer’s pool of 
commonplaces to be for both “John” and “wolf.” His passing theory, however, intends 
that in recognizing the new context of “John” and “wolf,” the hearer will have the 
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unrelated commonplaces drop away. The hearer himself has his pools of commonplaces 
associated with both “John” and “wolf” as his prior theory. Yet, in entering into the 
linguistic transaction, certain commonplaces will fall away according to how he must 
adapt his theory according to the new context of the words. The important bit to 
recognize is that the meaning, or pool, of commonplaces associated with “John” and 
“wolf” does not change between the speaker’s, nor the hearer’s prior and passing 
theories. Certain elements simply drop away due to the new context of their coming 
together.  
 
Bringing Black’s system of associated commonplaces into Davidson’s account of 
prior and passing theories allows metaphor to retain its original meaning while providing 
a more precise explanation of what occurs between speaker and hearer of metaphor. 
Davidson’s “use” is the speaker’s prior theory (literal meanings) put in a new context: his 
passing theory wants certain commonplaces to come together and certain commonplaces 
to fall away. The “effect” on the hearer is that certain commonplaces will drop away 
when the speaker modifies his prior theory to his the new context, creating his new 
passing theory. Though the speaker intends for certain commonplaces to fall away and 
not others, he cannot guarantee that this will happen—as we’ve decided, interpretation of 
metaphor is never exact or limited. Yet to the extent that passing theories between 
speaker and hearer converge in a linguistic interaction, or, to the extent that both speaker 
and hearer let drop more or less the same commonplaces, a metaphor is successful. 
Prior Theory Passing Theory 
Speaker 
Hearer 
What he expects the 
hearer’s pool of 
commonplaces to be for 
‘John’ and ‘wolf.’ 
Intends the hearer to recognize 
new context and adapt his 
theory to make those unwanted 
commonplaces fall away. 
Has commonplaces 
associated with ‘John’ and 
‘wolf’ established before 
the interaction. 
Adjusts the commonplaces of 
‘John’ and ‘wolf’ to fit in the 
context of the interaction. 
 











































The main difference between Black’s description of metaphor and Davidson’s lies 
in the fact that Black looks to the language itself and finds a shift in meaning, while 
Davidson clarifies that meaning stays literal, and we must instead look at what occurs 
between the speaker and hearer. We found a compromise between the two by looking to 
Davidson’s prior and passing theories of interpretation. The speaker uses the literal 
meanings of the words in a new context, intending that certain commonplaces fall away, 
to have a certain effect on the hearer. This effect is that the hearer’s adapts his prior 
theory to the new context, letting certain commonplaces fall away. The literal meanings 
do not change between prior and passing theories, but the context of the interaction acts 
upon which commonplaces are interpreted in the metaphor. Thus metaphor relies on both 
the literal meanings of the words, but gains its power through the effect had upon the 
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